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Over 43 million citizens in this country have some type of mental
or physical disability. 1 On July 28, 1990, the United States Congress
passed the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),2 ground-

*I dedicate this note to John T. Wettach, Jr. who contributed his intellectual acuity to the
conceptual framework of my argument, and his skill and unwavering support to the writing
process. I also would like to thank John P. Lowndes for his insightful suggestions, and Jeff C.
Schneider for his steadfast aid and encouragement.
1. U.S.C. § 12,101(a)(1) (Supp. II 1990).
2. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12,101-12,213 and 47
U.S.C. § 225, 611 (Supp. II 1990)).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1992

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 8
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

breaking civil rights legislation that provides protection for disabled
persons from discrimination in employment, transportation, public accommodations, and telecommunications.3 In the ADA, Congress recognized that discrimination against the disabled is a serious and pervasive
problem in our society. 4 Discrimination not only denies disabled persons access to education, jobs, and services, but robs them of their
right to contribute to their own welfare and that of their community,
a right most basic to our human dignity.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In section 2 of the ADA, the "Findings and Purposes" section,
Congress specifically invoked the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution as its authority to make the law. 5 Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly grants Congress the power
to enforce the provisions of the amendment, one of which is that no
state shall deny any person equal protection of the laws.6 This note
discusses, in light of Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment, what impact the congressional findings in the ADA regarding the disabled as a class will have on future equal protection
claims brought by disabled persons.
Part two of this note explores the concurrent duty of both the
Supreme Court and Congress to deal with issues of equal protection.
This section compares the operation of the Supreme Court's model for
equal protection analysis to the scope of Congress' power to address
equal protection under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Central to this discussion is the extent to which Congress, as opposed to
the Court, will define the substance of equal protection rights. The
Court has found that, under some circumstances, Congress may independently identify and remedy violations of equal protection, regardless of the Court's own finding in the matter. This note considers how
the Court's duty to interpret the law interacts with Congress' responsibility to enforce equal protection of the law.
Part three of this note examines the Supreme Court's refusal to
extend heightened judicial protection to the mentally retarded, and

3. Spe id.
4. Id. § 12,101(a)(2).
5. Id. § 12,101(b)(4). This section also invokes Congress' powers to regulate interstate
commerce granted in Article I, § 8, cl. 3 of the Constitution. See id.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol44/iss3/8

2

Loundes: The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: A Congressional Mand
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990

by implication, to disabled persons as a class. This section argues that
the Court's unwillingness to recognize the disabled as a quasi-suspect
class is a result of its inability as an appellate body to make accurate
findings of fact and to balance the interests of the individual against
those of the state. Because the Court's refusal is based upon misconceptions concerning mentally retarded persons, its findings do not
represent a normative standard of equal protection.
Finally, this note argues in part four that the congressional findings
in the ADA provide a clear mandate for the Court to consider disabled
persons a quasi-suspect class. In describing the condition of the disabled in the "Findings and Purposes" section, Congress employed the
same criteria that the Supreme Court has used to identify the specific
traits of classes given suspect status under traditional equal protection
analysis. 7 This note argues that section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment does in fact give Congress independent power to identify invidious discrimination against the disabled. Thus, Congress has the power
to designate disabled persons a protected class to remedy pervasive
violations of their right to equal protection, despite the Court's prior
holdings to the contrary.

II.

ENFORCEMENT OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, in part:
Section 1. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdictionthe equal protection of the laws.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriatelegislation, the provisions of this article.8
7. 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(a)(7) ("individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority
...."); see, e.g., Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (applying rational basis standard to
law which disadvantages nuclear families in acquisition of food stamps); Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 686-87 (1973) (applying intermediate level review to statutes which entitle women
workers to lesser benefits for their families than their male counterparts); United States v.
Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (introducing the suspect class analysis by
suggesting that prejudice against "discrete and insular minorities" may call for "more searching
judicial inquiry" than a mere rational basis test).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5 (emphasis added).
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The Judicial Model of Enforcement

Although section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment designates Congress as the enforcer of equal protection guarantees, the function of
enforcement has devolved largely on the judiciary. Rather than stemming from any explicit constitutional language, this function has arisen
from the longstanding Marbury v. Madison9 notion that it is "the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."10
The basic requirement of equal protection is that all similarly
situated persons be treated alike. 11 Laws classifying persons by some
identifiable characteristic, however, have the potential to violate this
broad command of the Fourteenth Amendment. 12 The Supreme Court
found it necessary to develop a way to examine legislation challenged
on equal protection grounds, and to this end it has fashioned a multi3
tiered model of review.
The Court reviews most challenged social or economic legislation
under an extremely deferential standard. 14 This lowest standard of
scrutiny, called mere rationality or the rational basis test, states that
"a statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any set of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justify it. '"15 When legislation burdens

9. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
10. Id. at 177.
11. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982); R.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253
U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
12. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216; R.S. Royster Guano, 253
U.S. at 415.
13. See generally JOHN E. NOWACK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.3 (1986) (reviewing various tests the Court uses to evaluate statutes under the Equal Protection Clause); Gerald
Gunther, Forward:In Search of Evolving Doctrine in a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1972) (comparing and contrasting the Burger Court's
application of the Equal Protection Clause with that of the Warren Court); Brenda Swiernga,
Comment, Still Newer Equal Protection:Impermissible Purpose Review in the 1984 Term, 53
U. CHI. L. REV. 1454 (1986) (arguing that in four cases during the 1984 term, the Court
strengthened the "rationality standard" in striking down state or municipal statutes).
14. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
15. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961). The levels of scrutiny often are defined
differently in different cases, especially the mere rationality standard. Compare Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911) (holding that at the lowest level of review a
statute will be deemed unconstitutional only if the classification is "purely arbitrary") with
McGowan, 366 U.S. at 425-26 (holding that the classification made by a statute will be found
unconstitutional if it is not reasonably related to some conceivable, legitimate legislative purpose)
and R.S. Royster Guano, 253 U.S. at 416 (holding that the classification must be reasonable,
not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation).
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certain classes or certain fundamental rights, however, the Court is
less deferential and examines the legislation with heightened
scrutiny.16 If a classification is based on race, 17 national origin, s or
alienage,19 which are designated as suspect classes, the Court employs
its strictest scrutiny. In order to pass constitutional muster, such a
statute must be shown as necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.20
The Court scrutinizes laws classifying women 2' or illegitimate children,2 designated as quasi-suspect classes, at an intermediate level.
At this level, statutory classifications will survive equal protection
challenges "to the extent they are substantially related to a legitimate
state interest."2
This judicial monopoly on equal protection analysis has changed
somewhat over the past three decades with Congress' slow awakening
to its Fourteenth Amendment responsibilities. Legislative history,?
case law extending back over one hundred years, and much commentary have all recognized the Fourteenth Amendment's mandate of

16. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
17. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that a statute which prohibits interracial
marriage violates equal protection).
18. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (subjecting law excluding Mexican-Americans
from jury service to strict scrutiny analysis and holding that law violates equal protection).
19. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
20. See id. at 370-76 (holding that a law which denied welfare benefits to aliens solely
because of their status failed the strict scrutiny analysis).
21. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682
(1973).
22. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982).
23. Id. However, the language of this level varies from case-to-case. For example, in Craig,
the Court stated that a gender-based classification "must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to [the] achievement of those objectives." Craig, 429
U.S. at 197.

24. See

JACOBUS TENBROEK,

THE ANTISLAVERY

ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENT 187-90 (1951) (noting that early drafts of the Fourteenth Amendment used the
phrase "necessary and proper" to describe the scope of congressional power under the amendment); CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 83 (1865) (stating that the change from "necessary
and proper" to "appropriate legislation" was not meant to diminish the scope of congressional
power).
25. See generally NOWACK, supra note 13, § 15.4 (noting that there is "strong evidence"
supporting the view that § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is a grant of "plenary power" to
Congress); Archibald Cox, The Role of Congress in ConstitutionalDeterminations, 40 U. CIN.
L. REv. 199, 228 (1971) (noting that Congress may determine a state law violates the Fourteenth
Amendment and set it aside even through the Supreme Court would have sustained the same
law); Laurent B. Frantz, CongressionalPower to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Against
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power to Congress. However, the scope of Congress' role to interpret
and enforce the amendment is a still developing area.
B.

The History of CongressionalEnforcement

In the landmark case of McCulloch v. Maryland,26 the Supreme
Court examined the extent to which Congress could make laws only
indirectly related to congressional responsibilities specifically enumerated in Article I, section 8 of the Constitution.Y In McCulloch, the
Court interpreted the section 8 "necessary and proper clause"
broadly, allowing Congress substantial discretion in making laws related to carrying out its enumerated duties. 29 The traditional test for
congressional authority arising from this clause derives from Justice
Marshall's invocation, "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which
are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist
'
[sic] with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."30
These words established the rational basis test for congressional legislation involving most social and economic issues. 3 1
The power of Congress to enforce the equal protection provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, arises not from the enumerated powers of Article I, but from the text of the amendment itself.3
The drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment included an enforcement
clause, section 5, granting Congress the authority to enforce the
amendment's guarantees.- This power was recognized early by the

Private Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353, 1356-57 (1964) (noting that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment were primarily interested in expanding congressional, not judicial, power); Stephen
F. Ross, Legislative Enforcement of Equal Protection, 72 MINN. L. REV. 311, 335 (1987)
(arguing that Congress should expand the judiciary's role by identifying additional suspect
classes and fundamental rights, and that Congress itself should engage in constitutional analysis
of state legislation).
26. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
27. Id. at 400-01.
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
29. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421.
30. Id.
31. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 303 (1988). Professor Tribe
states that so long as congressional action is rationally related to constitutionally enumerated
powers, the Court will not inquire into the legislators' motives. See id.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. The Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments also have
enforcement clauses. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
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Court. In 1878, the Court in Ex Parte Virginia stated, "It is the
power of Congress which has been enlarged. Congress is authorized
to enforce the prohibitions by appropriate legislation. Some legislation
is contemplated to make the amendments fully effective."'' The Court
reasoned that this enlargement of congressional power under section
5 extends to "[w]hatever legislation is . . . adapted to carry out the
objects the amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons
the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights .... ,,36
In Ex Parte Virginia, the Court addressed Congress' power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, advancing a policy already articulated by judicial decisions.3 7 In more recent cases, however, the Court
has examined Congress' ability under section 5 to go beyond violations
identified by the Court. In one such enactment, the Voting Rights
Act of 1965,as Congress prohibited state practices already approved
by the Court - thus remedying what Congress independently perceived as violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.
1. Katzenbach v. Morgan
In Katzenbach v. Morgan,3 9 the Supreme Court held that Congress
could outlaw literacy tests on equal protection grounds, even though
the Court had found previously that these tests were permissible.40
Under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Congress provided that no
person successfully completing the sixth grade in a Spanish-language
school of an American protectorate such as Puerto Rico could be denied
41
the right to vote because of the inability to read or write English.
New York voters challenged the law because it nullified state laws
requiring the use of English-language literacy tests to determine voter
eligibility.4 These challengers argued that section 5 of the Fourteenth

34. 100 U.s. 339 (1878).
35. Id. at 345.
36. Id. at 345-46.
37. Id. at 346.
38. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1973 to 1973bb (1988)).
39. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
40. Id. at 658.
41. Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(e)(2), 79 Stat. 437, 439 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973b(e)(2) (1988)).
42. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 643.45.
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Amendment gave Congress the power only to correct violations of
equal protection previously identified by the judiciary. 43 The challengers asserted that because the Court had earlier held that a literacy
requirement did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, 44 Congress
45
could not ban the tests.
The majority of the Court, in an opinion written by Justice Brennan, upheld the congressional provision. 46 In examining the parameters
of congressional authority, the Court relied on Ex Parte Virginiaand the McCulloch standard. 48 The Court noted that, "Correctly viewed, § 5 is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress
to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation
is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment."' "9
The Court analogized the powers granted in section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to Congress' Article I powers.- As with the necessary
and proper clause, the Court found that section 5 gave Congress the
discretion to enforce equal protection by legislation which meets the
rationality standard of McCulloch.51 The majority rejected the idea
that congressional power was confined to operation in areas already
adjudged unconstitutional, cautioning that such an approach would
hamper congressional resourcefulness and depreciate congressional re52
sponsibility for carrying out enforcement.
The Brennan opinion offered two alternative theories for its conclusion that Congress could outlaw the literacy tests.- First, Congress
could have concluded that the Puerto Rican minority, previously disenfranchised by the literacy tests, suffered from unequal access to
governmental services,- a clear violation of the court-articulated principles of equal protection.- By extending the voting franchise, Congress gave members of this minority the political power to prevent

43. Id. at 648.
44. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Election, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
45. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 648.
46. Id.
47. 100 U.S. 339 (1878).
48. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 650-51.
49. Id. at 651.
50. Id. at 650.
51. Id. at 651.
52. Id. at 648-49.
53. Id. at 652-56.
54. Id. at 653. Governmental services include public schools, public housing, and law enforcement. Id. at 652.
55. Id. at 652-53.
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discriminatory treatment in the future. Under this theory, Congress
was "well within [its] authority"5 to find facts and frame remedies
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment by identifying the needs
5
of the minority and protecting their right to vote.
Second, the Court asserted that Congress could reasonably have
concluded that the literacy test itself violated the Equal Protection
Clause, and therefore Congress could bar its use.5 9 Justice Brennan
framed the question before the Court as, 'Without regard to whether
the judiciary would find that the Equal Protection Clause itself nullifies [the] literacy requirement . . . could Congress prohibit [it] by
legislating under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment? '" While the
Court did not directly discuss the conflict between Congress and the
Court regarding literacy tests, the significance of the question presented is that it assumes there are some circumstances under which
Congress may itself identify violations of equal protection which the
Court has previously declined to recognize.61 Under this theory, the
Court viewed Congress' action as a legitimate use of its power regardless of any judicial pronouncement to the contrary. 62 Therefore, the
substance of the second Morgan theory is that congressional power
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment includes power to independently identify violations of the Equal Protection Clause.6
The second theory is more radical because it comes close to putting
Congress in the role of constitutional interpreter.6 Justice Harlan's

56. Id.
57. Id. at 653.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 653-56. Whether Congress can constrict as well as expand equal protection rights
is not within the scope of this note. Justice Brennan addresses the issue in footnote 10 of his
opinion, anticipating a major objection of the dissent; however, his explanation seems unsatisfactory. Id. at 652 n.10. Several commentators have discussed the issue. See William Cohen,
Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603,
617-19 (1975); Irving A. Gordon, The Nature and Uses of CongressionalPower Under Section
Five of the FourteenthAmendment to Overcome Decisions of the Supreme Court, 72 Nw. U. L.
REV. 656, 662-64 (1977); Ross, supra note 25, at 330-32; Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure:
The Legal Status of Underenforced ConstitutionalNorms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1230-41
(1978).
60. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 649 (emphasis added).
61. Gordon, supra note 59, at 662.
62. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 649, 653-56.
63. Cox, supra note 25, at 228-29.
64.

See TRIBE, supra note 31, at 342-44.
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dissent, joined only by Justice Stewart, stated that the majority opinion gave too much deference to congressional judgment. r Justice Harlan argued that the majority wrongly gave "Congress the power to
define the substantive scope of the Amendment." ' This power, in
Justice Harlan's view, should have remained with the judiciary.6
The majority, however, found adequate justification for its position.
Aside from the historical evidence that the supporters and sponsors
of the Fourteenth Amendment were primarily interested in augmenting the power of Congress,68 the Court relied heavily on the notion
of deference to the legislative body. 69 Legislatures are superior factfinders, the Court noted, and are better able "to assess and weigh
the various conflicting considerations," such as the pervasiveness of
discrimination, the adequacy or availability of alternate remedies, and
the nature and significance of the state's interest. 70 The Court emphasized that it was not its role to review these congressional resolutions of fact. 71 Rather, the Court should only inquire far enough "to

65. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 669 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
67. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan continued this theme in a dissent to another
voting rights case, Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 152 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Justice Harlan argued that "Congress' expression of [its] view . . .
cannot displace the duty of this Court to make an independent determination whether Congress
has exceeded its powers." Id. at 204 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Harlan stressed that this kind of interpretation should be left to the Court because
Congress is controlled only by the political process, and political restraints alone were never
intended, within the constitutional framework, to allow Congress the power of interpretation.
Id. at 205 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The framers, Justice Harlan
points out, allotted to Congress the power to amend the Constitution only when two-thirds of
that body so voted. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Allowing Congress
to pass by mere majority vote a law interpreting an amendment would fly in the face of this
original intent. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
68. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 648 n.7. Justice Brennan included in footnote 8 of his opinion
quotations from Senator Howard, who introduced the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866, which
clearly show the amendment was meant to imbue Congress with the duty and power to see
that all the sections of the amendment are carried out. Id. at 648 n.8. Additionally, in footnote
7 Justice Brennan cites the following scholars on the Fourteenth Amendment: ROBERT J.
HARRIS, THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY 33-56 (1960); TENBROEK, supra note 24, at 187-217;
Laurent B. Frantz, CongressionalPower to Enforce the FourteenthAmendment Against Private
Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353, 1356-57 (1964). Morgan, 384 U.S. at 648 n.7.
69. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 653.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict
as it did."' '
2. Oregon v. Mitchell
In the only subsequent Supreme Court decision examining the
extent of Congress' powers under section 5, the Court considered
Congress' power to overrule a pronouncement of state legislatures,
not of the Court itself.7 3 In Oregon v. Mitchell," the Court addressed
a challenge to the 1970 amendments to the Voting Rights Act reducing
the minimum voting age to eighteen years for federal, state, and local
elections, and barring literacy tests for five years. 75
The result was a sharply divided Court, with five opinions and no
single opinion supported by more than three Justices. 76 Shifting bare
majorities on each issue resulted in the Court's overturning Congress'
extension of voting rights in state and local elections, upholding the
extension in federal elections, and affirming the ban on literacy tests."
Because Justice Black's opinion alone comprised all three majority
decisions, it became the decisive holding. Justice Black believed Congress' power to enforce equal protection was restricted in the area of
state voter qualifications as long as racial groups were not implicated. 8
79
However, Justice Black's opinion was joined by no other Justice.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White and Marshall, 80 and Justice Douglas, writing separately, 81 argued to uphold the extension of
voting rights under the Morgan theories, and thus affirm Congress'
independent power to find violations of equal protection. They believed
that under any circumstances Congress was within its rights to engage
in its own equal protection analysis." Justice Stewart, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, however, opposed congressional

72. Id.
73. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 117.
76. Id. at 117-19.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 130.
79. Id. at 117.
80. See id. at 248-49 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
81. Id. at 143-44 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
82. See id. at 248-49 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 143-44
(Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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regulation of any voting requirements, believing that the Constitution
specifically delegated such authority to the states, and that Congress
had no power to find violations of the Fourteenth Amendment in that
realm.- Similarly, Justice Harlan believed that the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause did not extend to the state's power
to set voter qualifications.8
While the significance of Mitchell is obscure, it seems likely that
it limited Congress' power under section 5 only minimally if at all.
The opinions of Justices Brennan, 'White, Marshall, Douglas, and Black
taken together as a majority sustain the Morgan holding to this extent:
in areas not exclusively reserved to the states, Congress has the power
to determine the substance of equal protection guarantees regardless
of the findings of state legislatures or of the Supreme Court.5 Thus,
the salient holding of Morgan remains substantially intact: Congress
may go beyond the Court to define the substance of equal protection.Many have hailed the recognition of congressional power under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as an appropriate and important element of constitutional interpretation. Professor Archibald Cox
has stated that far from being a radical change in constitutional jurisprudence, the Morgan decision "follows logically from familiar principles of constitutional adjudication. . ."8 Yale Law Professor Stephen
Carter has written that the decision stands for "the missing link to
the promise of a better future through law: When the courts falter in

83. See id. at 287-91 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stewart
also restated his disagreement with the second theory of Morgan, stating that Congress did
not have the power "to determine as a matter of substantive constitutional law what situations
fall within the ambit of the [equal protection] clause." Id. at 296 (Stewart, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
84. Id. at 154 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
85. See Ross, supra note 25, at 329-30.
86. See id. More recent Court opinions have continued to support the position that Congress
may exercise broad powers under its enforcement mandate in § 5. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448 (1980). In Fullilove, the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, reaffirmed
the holding from Morgan that § 5 was to be interpreted in the same way as the Necessary and
Proper Clause. Id. at 476-77. Quoting from Justice Brennan's 1966 opinion, the Court recognized
that § 5 gave Congress "discretion in determining whether legislation is needed to secure the
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 476 (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U.S. 641, 651 (1966)); see also City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 176 (1980) (recognizing Morgan as giving Congress broad power to enforce the Civil War amendments).
87. Archibald Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Pronwtion of Human
Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 106 (1966).
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the march toward a just society, the Congress can step in and fill the
breach." 88 Carter further observed that a significant portion of the
scholarship on Morgan shares the common vision that the enforcement
clause of section 5 grants to Congress "the authority to make substantive adjustments that expand the scope of rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment."' ' As for a clash between Congress and the Court,
he stated:
The initial definition of those rights might be made by the
Supreme Court, but the Congress - whether because of its
special fact-finding competence, because of its unique institutional role in securing individual liberty against state oppression, or for some other reason - can give the force of law
to its disagreement with the Justices. Clever language aside,
this is what the majority in Morgan seems to have said, and
this formulation has become popular wisdom.Y
C.

The Principleof Deference:InstitutionalLimitations of the Court

The Supreme Court, as an institution, does not always enforce the
ideal of the Equal Protection Clause to its fullest conceptual extent. 91
In many instances, the Court has declined to hold that all persons
who are similarly situated be treated the same by social or economic
legislation2 Under the Court's multi-tiered equal protection model,
unless the legislation in question makes a suspect or quasi-suspect
classification or burdens a fundamental right, the Court will examine
the statute using the most deferential analysis, the rational basis standard of review. 93 Under this standard, the Court limits its review to
determining whether a legislature's finding is clearly "arbitrary" or
"irrational."94

88. Stephen L. Carter, The Morgan "Power" and the ForcedReconsideration of Constitutional Decisions, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 819, 824-25 (1986).
89. Id. at 830.
90. Id.
91. Sager, supra note 59, at 1216-18 (explaining why courts underenforce the Equal Protection Clause); Ross, supra note 25, at 322 (concluding that the Court underenforces the Equal
Protection Clause when the Court applies the rational basis test).
92. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (upholding a
law burdening the poor as a class).
93. See Ross, supra note 25, at 315-19. Professor Ross states that "whenever the Court
applies the rational basis test, it is underenforcing the equal protection clause." Id. at 322.
94. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911) (reviewing a statute
at the lowest level of scrutiny, the Court stated that a statute will be deemed unconstitutional
only if the classification is "purely arbitrary").
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In practice, the Court's enforcement of equal protection operates
in such a way that some groups who may be burdened by a discriminatory law will not necessarily get the same protection as other
groups. For example, under the multi-tiered system an equal protection challenge to a law which adversely affected a class of poor persons
would not be given the same scrutiny as a law which adversely affected
a class of African-Americans. 95 The statute affecting the black citizens
would almost always be found to violate their equal protection rights,whereas the corresponding one affecting the poor would likely survive
the challenge. 97 Both of these classes might be equally unfairly burdened, yet the Court will protect only one. Thus, the Court implicitly
recognizes in the tiered model a limitation on its ability to enforce the
98
normative standard of equal protection.
The decision of the judiciary not to strictly scrutinize every law
by which the legislature creates a class, and thereby not truly enforce
equal protection to its fullest theoretical extent, arises from the notion
of judicial deference to Congress.99 Because of the different duties and
capabilities of these co-equal branches, two principles of judicial deference have evolved.10 0
First, in some cases the judiciary must defer to the legislature
because in its role as ultimate arbiter, it lacks the institutional competence to act also as the factfinder. 10 1 The judicial branch must often
defer to the legislature simply because courts can only perform a
limited number of functions.°2 Congress or any legislature is a better

95. Compare Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 1 (upholding a school-financing system which adversely
affected poor school children) with Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overturning
a school segregation law adversely affecting African-American school children).
96. See, e.g., Brown, 347 U.S. at 483.
97. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 1.
98. Gordon, supra note 59, at 671; Ross, supra note 25, at 321.
99. See Cox, supra note 25, at 228; Sager supra note 59, at 1224; see also Schweiker v.
Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981) (stating that unless a statute employs an inherently invidious
classification or impinges on fundamental rights, the Court should exercise only a limited power
of review over Congress); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966) (deferring to the
judgment of Congress and upholding federal legislation banning an English literacy requirement
as a restriction on the right to vote).
100. See Ross, supra note 25, at 323.
101. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 247-48 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Gordon, supranote 59, at 659. Professor Gordon notes that "without usurping
the role of the Court, Congress may exercise its superior institutional functions as a factfinder
and public forum in the resolution of civil rights controversies." Id.
102. Cox, supra note 25, at 199-200.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol44/iss3/8

14

Loundes: The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: A Congressional Mand
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990

factfinding body than an appellate court. 10 3 Legislatures have subpoena
power, and can convene committees and conduct lengthy inquiries into
complex factual matters. 1' Unlike judicial bodies, legislatures contain
many members with varied backgrounds and experience who bring a
wider knowledge of current social and economic conditions to bear on
10 5
a question than could a court.
In making laws, legislatures use their institutional abilities to ascertain and weigh facts and strike a fair balance between opposing interests, a function necessary to the legislative process. 10 6 Because almost all statutes make classifications, it would be counter-productive
for an ill-equipped judiciary to apply strict scrutiny to these laws.107
If the Court strictly scrutinized every law challenged on an equal
protection basis, it would likely invalidate most of them. 08
The second principle justifying judicial deference is that legislatures
are democratically elected to represent the people, unlike federal
judges or Supreme Court Justices who are appointed.109 The Court
has stated that it "properly exercises only a limited review over Congress, the appropriate representative body through which the public
makes democratic choices among alternative solutions to social and
economic problems. ' 11 The Constitution presumes that, in general,
even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process."' Consequently, in the area of equal protection, the
judiciary should intervene in this democratic process only when a
2
classification is inherently invidious or involves a fundamental right.1

103.

See Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 248-49 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part); Cox, supra note 25, at 228-30.
104.
105.
106.
107.
develop

108.

Cox, supra note 25, at 209.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 208-09. Professor Cox states that "clourts have always found it hard to
the background facts in constitutional cases." Id. at 209.

Ross, supra note 25, at 323.

109. Id.; Cox, supra note 25, at 210-11. Professor Cox notes that judicial bodies are countermajoritarian, an unelected minority whose power, when used to set aside decisions of the
legislature, is objectionable unless used solely to give effect to the words or well-grounded
traditions of the Constitution. Id. at 210; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482

(1965) (stating that the Court does not "sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom,
need, and propriety of laws that touch economic-problems, business affairs, or social conditions").
110. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981).
111. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 102 (1979); see also Ross, supra note 25, at 327
(explaining how the legislative process balances competing interests and the will of the people).
112. Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 230.
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Accordingly, these principles of deference represent areas in which
the Court has limited itself from fully enforcing the Equal Protection
Clause.1 13 The Court itself has recognized these limitations, and has
noted that they stem not from the Fourteenth Amendment, but from
the nature of judicial review. 114 As Justice Brennan stated in Mitchell:
"The nature of the judicial process makes it an inappropriate forum
for the determination of complex factual questions of the kind so often
'
He went on to say that this
involved in constitutional adjudication."115
restriction on the power of the judiciary has long been recognized by
the Court as "a salutary principle of judicial decision"116 and is recognized as "one of the 'self-imposed restraints intended to protect [the
Court] and the state against irresponsible exercise of [the Court's]
unappealable power.'1 17 Justice Brennan noted, however, that because
these limitations on the judiciary arise from the nature of the judicial
process, they do not apply to Congress when it exercises its power
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment."18
D.

The Parameters of CongressionalPower

Commentators have agreed with Justice Brennan that the limitations on the Court do not mean that Congress cannot fully enforce
the equal protection mandate that those similarly situated must be

113. See Ross, supra note 25, at 321-22. Professors Ross and Sager have both compared
this judicial deference to the political question doctrine of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962),
which states that the Court will not address the constitutionality of an issue if it finds a "lack
of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving" an issue. Baker, 369 U.S. at
217; see Ross, supra note 25, at 324-25; Sager, supra note 59, at 1225-26. Just as it does in the
arena of political questions, the Court often does not reach the merits of a statute's constitutionality under equal protection because the Court defers to the legislative judgment. Ross, supra
note 25, at 324-25; see Sager, supra note 59, at 1225-26.
114. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 247 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
115. Id. at 247-48 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
116. Id. at 247 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Metropolitan
Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 584 (1935)).
117. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 247 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 282 (1947)).
118. Id. at 248 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This idea also is
implicit in the Court's holding in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 656 (1966).
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ated alike. 119 As Professor Cox has stated regarding the roles of
e two branches of government:
[T]he question, is the statute constitutional, may deserve
one answer from the legislator and a different answer from
the judge because some of the [questions] on which the legislator is free, indeed, has a duty, to make up his own mind
may be foreclosed from judicial consideration by the judge's
duty to defer to legislative judgment. In such cases, although
the Supreme Court purports to say that the challenged measure is constitutional, in truth the decision is only that the
measure does not conflict with the Constitution given the
finding or judgment that Congress has expressed.... 120
When the Court does not fully enforce equal protection where it
.ploys only minimum level scrutiny, it leaves those areas free for
ngressional enforcement. 12 That is to say, if the Court refuses to
)sely review a statute for reasons of deference, Congress may make
i independent finding that the statute violates equal protection,
.ereby using its power to fully enforce the normative principles of
te Equal Protection Clause. 1 ' Minimum level scrutiny is not a judicial
.tempt to formulate a full and complete theory of enforcement of the
)nstitutional doctrine of equal protection. 23 Rather, it is a minimum
;andard of analysis for equal protection cases.12 4As Professor Stephen
.oss observed:
If the underlying norm is that all persons similarly situated
should be treated alike, Congress does not substitute its
judgment for the courts' when proscribing a state statute

119. See generally Ross, supra note 25, at 327 ("The Constitution expressly authorizes
ngress to participate in the constitutional debate concerning whether statutes meet equal
)tection norms."); Sager, supra note 59, at 1239-41 (explaining that although Congress is
;horized to legislate equal protection norms, its authority is limited by recognized constitutional

ues and where the constitutional norm is fully enforced by the Supreme Court).
120.
121.

Cox, supra note 25, at 200.
Ross, supra note 25, at 331; Sager, supra note 59, at 1239; see Gordon, supra note 59,

w71.
'22. Sager, supra note 59, at 1240.
23.
'4.

Ross, supra note 25, at 331.
Id.
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that was sustained under the rational basis test .... In fact,
Congress may use its institutional skills that the courts do
not possess to protect a judicially established norm. 1'
Thus, section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment allows Congress to
enact legislation that fills in areas of equal protection that the judiciary
has left unenforced.126 Where the Courts are held back by institutional
concerns from exhausting the concept of equal protection, congressional attempts to expand the judiciary's limited interpretation achieve
the goal of full enforcement of the Equal Protection Clause.'This view of Congress' section 5 power is consistent with the principles established in Marbur v. Madison.'1 Initially, it may seem as
though the Court, in the equal protection area, is abandoning its duty
under the Constitution to interpret the law. Instead, having expounded
the underlying principles of equal protection and reserving the right
to strictly scrutinize suspect legislation, the Court's model allows Congress to use its special competence to factually identify other violations.' 29 Because the Court is merely recognizing its own weaknesses
and Congress' strengths, this congressional exercise of power is not
an affront to Marbury v. Madison.'30
E.

Identifying Suspect Classes

Professor Ross argues that Congress may and should use its power
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to expand the
judiciary's role "by identifying additional suspect classes and fundamental rights and by increasing the level of scrutiny in specified types
of equal protection cases."1 31 Ross writes, "Congress is especially competent to determine whether certain traits are relevant to state classifications because of its fact-finding and policy decision-making
skills.' ' 32 Because "Congress is not constrained by institutional concerns . . . [it] should use a two-pronged test to [determine] whether

125. Id. at 331-32 (citation omitted).
126. Sager, supra note 59, at 1239.
127. Id.
128. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
129. See Sager, supra note 59, at 1230, 1232-35 (describing the Court's "model" as outlined
in Mitchell and Morgan, but criticizing the model because it "assumes a legislative superiority
in factfinding which is not self-evident").
130. See Gordon, supra note 59, at 670-71; Sager, supra note 59, at 1230.
131. Ross, supra note 25, at 335.
132. Id.
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to declare a particular nonracial trait suspect... ."1 First, Congress
should evaluate the degree to which a distinction based on a trait is
truly relevant in a context in which a state might legislate. 134 Then,
it should consider whether persons with this trait lack the political
power to defend themselves against discriminatory treatment. 135 In
this way, Ross concludes, Congress can best use its section 5 power
36
to contribute to equal protection jurisprudence.1

III. THE SUPREME COURT AND EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAIMS OF THE DISABLED

A.

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center

Although Congress had long recognized the need for legislation
protecting the rights of the disabled in areas such as federal jobs,
education, and housing,"1 7 it was not until 1985 that the Supreme Court
squarely addressed the issue of suspect status for disabled persons.
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,,"s the Court declined
to recognize the mentally retarded as a suspect or quasi-suspect class
under its equal protection principles,1 9 thus declining to apply
40
heightened scrutiny to the statute in question.
In Cleburne, petitioners sought to overturn a Fifth Circuit decision'14 holding the mentally retarded to be a quasi-suspect class,142 and
invalidating a zoning ordinance under a heightened scrutiny analysis.14
The city of Cleburne's zoning ordinance required a special operating
permit for hospitals for the "feeble-minded.'" Cleburne's city council

133.
134.

Id.
Id.

135. Id.
136. See id.
137. See The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1988)); Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No.
91-230, Title VI, §§ 601-662, 84 Stat. 121, 175-88 (1970) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§
1400-1454 (1988)); Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, Pub. L. No.
94-103, 89 Stat. 486 (1975) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.(1988)).
138. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
139. Id. at 442.
140. Id. at 446.
141. Cleburne Living Ctr. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1984), affd in part
and vacated in part, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
142. Id. at 198.
143. Id. at 200.
144. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 436.
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ruled that respondent could not operate its proposed group home for
mentally retarded adults without the permit, but then denied the
permit in order to block the home.145
In a majority opinion delivered by Justice White, the Supreme
Court overruled the lower court's identification of the mentally retarded as a quasi-suspect class. 146 Invoking the proviso that "all persons
similarly situated should be treated alike," the Court noted that "Section 5 of the [Fourteenth] Amendment empowers Congress to enforce
this mandate, but absent controlling congressionaldirectionthe courts
have themselves devised standards for determining the validity of
state legislation ... that is challenged as denying equal protection. '147
The Court fit the mentally retarded into their pre-existing equal protection model, and found that as a class they were not entitled to the
Court's heightened protection.14 Therefore, laws affecting mentally
retarded persons should be reviewed under the rational basis stan149
dard.
Surprisingly, however, the Cleburne Court invalidated the zoning
ordinance as applied to Cleburne Living Center, finding that the ordinance failed the mere rationality standard. 10 Although the Court asserted that it used no more than the lowest level standard,' 51 the
Court nevertheless closely examined the legislative purposes for denying the permit. 52 Each proffered state interest was dismissed as impermissible'0 or as not rationally furthered by application of the permit
requirement.- Ultimately, the Court found that the true basis for
M

145. Id. at 436-37.
146. Id. at 442.
147. Id. at 439-40 (emphasis added).
148. Id. at 442-46.
149. Id. at 446.
150. Id. at 450.
151. Id. at 448.
152. Id. at 448-50.
153. Id. at 448. The council first claimed that the permit could be denied because of the
negative attitudes of the other property owners and the fears of the elderly residents of the
neighborhood. Id. The Court noted that the council could not give effect to private biases
through laws. Id.
154. Id. at 449-50. The council urged that the denial of the permit furthered the legitimate
objectives of safety; the home was located across from a junior high school whose students
might harass the residents, and was in a 500-year flood plain which might have to be evacuated
in times of flooding. Id. at 449. The council also expressed concern about the city's legal liability
for the residents, the size of the home and number of residents, the congestion of the streets,
fire hazards, and the serenity of the neighborhood. Id. at 450. The Court found that none of
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the denial of the permit "appears to us to rest on an irrational prejudice
against the mentally retarded."1This finding is at odds with the Court's concomitant refusal to find
the mentally retarded to be at least a quasi-suspect class in need of
heightened judicial protection. As pointed out by Justice Marshall in
an opinion joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, concurring in
part and dissenting in part, 156 the Court's search for the true purpose
of the ordinance, and its analysis of the close fit between the classification and the purpose, did not reflect the traditional rational basis
test. Rather, the analysis showed a "second order" rational basis test,
or a surreptitious application of heightened scrutiny. 157 In other words,
the Court first asserted that the mentally retarded as a group were
adequately protected for equal protection purposes under the most
deferential standard, but then analyzed the ordinance as though they
were not. 15 The Court seemed unwilling to overtly extend heightened
protection, yet it recognized that the mentally retarded in this case
had been the victims of pure discrimination. This apparent inconsistency in the Court's actions can be explained in terms of its lack of
institutional competency as an appellate body to find facts and balance
interests.
B. Cleburne's Analysis of the Mentally Retarded:
The Two Approaches to the Question of Suspectness
The Court's refusal to extend heightened protection to the mentally
retarded resulted from its taking two conflicting approaches to the

these concerns would be any different if the home was, for instance, used as a fraternity or

boarding house, which would not need the special permit, rather than for retarded citizens. Id.
at 449-50.
155. Id. at 450.
156. Id. at 455 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
157. Id. at 458-59 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For instance,
Justice Marshall noted that under the "one step at a time" theory of the traditional mere
rationality test, the purpose of preventing a fire hazard would be constitutional. Id. at 458
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Additionally, he pointed out that under

the traditional rationality standard "we do not sift through the record to determine whether
policy decisions are squarely supported by a firm factual foundation . . . [and] the burden is
not on the legislature to convince the Court that the lines it has drawn are sensible; legislation
is presumptively constitutional ....
Id. at 458-59 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting

in part).
158. Id. at 442-50. In fact, the district court found similarly that the permit was denied
because of prejudice against the mentally retarded, yet found that because it could not apply
a standard more stringent than rational basis, the ordinance must be upheld. See id. at 437.
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task before it. First, the Court openly stated it was institutionally
incompetent to assess the true nature of the condition of the mentally
retarded, and thus should defer to the better informed legislatures
for the proper treatment of the mentally retarded as a class. 9 Second,
the Court sought to justify its hands-off treatment by in fact assessing
the condition of the mentally retarded, something it had explicitly
16
professed it was not in a position to do.
Under the first approach, the Court stated that it hesitated to lay
down a standard which might interfere with legislative determination
to address antipathy towards the mentally retarded. 161 It also declared
that it was not competent to find sufficient facts to define the class,
nor to weigh such facts against possible interests of the state. 62 The
Court stated that such determinations were a "difficult and often technical matter, very much a task for legislators guided by qualified
professionals and not by the perhaps ill-informed opinions of the
judiciary."' For these reasons it was reluctant to declare the mentally
retarded a quasi-suspect class."'"
The Court's position here is crucial because it is an articulation of
the Court-recognized institutional inability to adequately comprehend
the experiences of mentally retarded persons. If indeed the Court did
not possess sufficient facts to make a determination of suspectness,'6
the Court's first approach was a proper identification of an area of
judicial incompetence. Given the institutional limitations on the Court's
ability to find facts and weigh interests, it is likely that the mere
rationality standard was the correct one to apply. This determination
would leave the identification of equal protection violations, should

159. Id. at 44243.
160. See id. at 44346.
161. Id. at 44245. The Court stated that heightened scrutiny would require the Court to
make substantive judgments about legislative decisions, and the Court believed that it was not
in as good a position as the legislatures to make judgments concerning laws dealing with the
mentally retarded. Id. at 443. Also, the Court feared that heightened scrutiny might have the
effect of dampening beneficial legislation, because lawmakers, required to justify their decisions
under heightened scrutiny, might refrain from acting at all. See id. at 444.
162. See id. at 444-46.
163. Id. at 443.
164. Id. at 442, 446.
165. Id. at 442-50, 460. Yet, the majority found sufficient facts to conduct, in Justice
Marshall's terms, a "searching inquiry" into the basis of the contested ordinance. Id. at 460
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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166
they exist, to the special competence and responsibility of Congress.
The Court, however, went further.
Uider its second approach, the Court compared certain suppositions about the retarded to three traditional criteria for identifying
suspect classifications.167 The criteria were the relevance of the trait
to legislation, the extent of societal prejudice, and the political power
of the class. 16 The Court's reasoning concerning these criteria, however, was not based on full discovery of relevant facts considered in
the context of social reality. Rather, they reasoned from premises
arising out of the limited resources and typical preconceptions of any
judicial body.16 9 Without accurate information concerning both the
range of the effects of mental retardation and the position and experience of the mentally retarded in our society, the Court's holdings were
not a full normative resolution of constitutional principles. Thus, instead of being expressions of underlying constitutional law, the Court's
findings of the suspectness criteria were merely judicial determinations
whose accuracy was contingent on the findings of fact being correct.

C.

Cleburne's Three Criteriaof Suspectness

The first criterion that the Court examined was whether mental
retardation was a characteristic relevant to legislative decisions. 170
Finding that it was, the Court noted that if a group has "distinguishing
characteristics which are relevant to interests the state has the authority to implement, 17' then the Court should review such legislation
under a deferential standard 7 2 The rationale behind this is clear: if
a class has characteristics which consistently bear directly on truly
legitimate state interests, then for the purposes of the legislation that
class is not similarly situated to other classes."' Thus, under equal

166. See supra notes 101-12 and accompanying text.
167. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442-46.
168. Although the Court never explicitly stated these were the three factors it was analyzing, the factors are implicit in the Court's reasoning. See id.
169. See id. at 443. For example, the Court reasons that because lawmakers have been
addressing the "difficulties" of the retarded, this is evidence refuting "a continuing antipathy
or prejudice" towards mentally disabled persons. Id.
170. Id. at 442-43. Additionally, the Court mentioned the criterion of immutability; although
this is a traditional requirement for suspectness, the Court did not give it much weight. Id. at
442 n.10.
171. Id. at 441.
172. Id. at 443.
173. See id. at 442-43.
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protection analysis, such laws burdening this class do not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment. 174 It would appear that with its pronouncement that retardation is "relevant," the Court was fully enforcing
constitutional principles because such "relevance" seems to put the
class outside the reach of section 5.175
In contrast to mental retardation, the Court noted that gender is
a trait most often not relevant to legislative determinations, because
there is rarely a legitimate reason to legislate based on the difference
between women and men. 176 The Court relied on Frontiero v.
Richardson177 in stating that gender "frequently bears no relation to
ability to perform or contribute to society."178 Therefore, the Cleburne
Court noted, statutes distinguishing between genders "very likely reflect outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of men and
women.' 1 79 According to the Court's implicit comparison, then, gender
classifications deserve heightened scrutiny because the characteristic
is so seldom relevant, while mental retardation is too often relevant
to warrant similar protection.
The Court itself admitted, however, that as a class the mentally
retarded are not "all cut from the same pattern . . . they range from
those whose disability is not immediately evident to those who must
be constantly cared for."'' s0 This statement demonstrates what is certainly true about the mentally retarded: that individual ability varies
directly with the need for legislative care. As Justice Marshall observed, "Similarly [to the issue of gender], that some retarded people
have reduced capacities in some areas does not justify using retardation as a proxy for reduced capacity in areas where relevant individual
variations in capacity do exist."'' Given a characteristic which is only

174. See id. at 439 (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment essentially commands that "all
persons similarly situated should be treated alike").
175. See id. at 442-43.
176. Id. at 440-41.
177. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
178. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441 (citing Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686).
179. Id. at 441.
180. Id. at 442.
181. Id. at 468 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Marshall also wrote:
That a characteristic may be relevant under some or even many circumstances
does not suggest any reason to presume it relevant under other circumstances
where there is reason to suspect it is not. A sign that says "men only" looks very
different on a bathroom door than a courthouse door.
Id. at 468-69 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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sometimes relevant, the constitutional question is not how often the
trait is relevant, but whether or not there is evidence of pervasive
and historic discrimination which would mark the classification as potentially improper.12
Thus, the Court's second and third criteria of suspectness, whether
the retarded face prejudice and whether they are politically powerless, 18 both bear on the full examination of the "relevance" issue for
the purpose of discovering a possible tendency in legislators to make
such a classification based on improper motives. In addressing these
two criteria, the Court considered only recent beneficial legislation
directed at the retarded.'8 These laws, the Court held, demonstrate
both that the mentally retarded do not face continuing prejudice and
antipathy, and that they are not politically powerless in attracting the
attention of lawmakers. 1' The Court found that without the added
disadvantages of prejudice or political powerlessness, the retarded as
a class do not need heightened protection.as
The Court's narrow focus on recent reform legislation as illustrating
lack of prejudice reflects an incomplete understanding of discrimination
faced by the retarded. The existence of pervasive societal antipathy,
in both the past and present, is undeniable;187 the Court itself admitted

182. Id. at 470 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Marshall
points out that heightened or mid-level scrutiny, as opposed to strict scrutiny, evolved in order
to provide careful review in separating the permissible from the invalid classifications. Id. at
469 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
183. See id. at 443-45.
184. Id. at 444-45.
185. Id. at 444-46.
186. Id. at 445-46. Similarly, the Court noted, advanced age is a characteristic which is
only sometimes relevant, but which also does not evoke additional factors such as prejudice or
stereotyping which might otherwise make it suspect. Id. at 441. The Court cited an earlier
decision in which it distinguished age from other protected classes on the ground that the elderly
have not historically faced "purposeful unequal treatment," nor has their treatment been based
on stereotypes not reflecting their true abilities. Id. (citing Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement
v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976)). While the Cleburne Court asserts that the classifications
of both mental retardation and age are based on relevant characteristics unaccompanied by any
important considerations which would cast suspicion upon their use, the two classifications can
be distinguished on those very grounds. See id. at 461-65 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); infra notes 187-91 and accompanying text.
187. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 461-65 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In his opinion, Justice Marshall chronicles the "'lengthy and tragic history' of isolation and
discrimination that "has perpetuated the ignorance, irrational fears, and stereotyping that long
have plagued" the retarded. Id. at 461, 464 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (quoting Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 303 (1978) (citation
omitted)).
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that "there have been and there will continue to be instances of discrimination against the retarded that are in fact invidious."18 Additionally, the Court noted the lower court's finding of a "history of 'unfair
and often grotesque mistreatment' of the retarded. 189 The determination of such prejudice should be more important to the finding of
suspectness than the existence of recent beneficial legislation. It is
this type of prejudice that makes likely both underlying hostility in
some lawmakers, and an improper purpose behind some laws already
in place.'-" As Professor Tribe stated, "A history of continuous and
pervasive deprivations and exclusions, the product of both legislative
blindness and bias towards the disabled, justifies the exercise of
heightened judicial scrutiny."' 19
Similarly, the Court's analysis of the political power of the mentally
retarded did not fully explore that criterion. The existence of recent
legislation aimed at mitigating discrimination against mentally retarded persons192 is not necessarily evidence of their political power.
As Justice Marshall stated, "For the retarded ... much has changed
in recent years, but much remains the same; out-dated statutes are
still on the books, and irrational fears . . . continue to stymie recognition of the dignity and individuality of retarded people.' 193 Justice
Marshall further reasoned that legislation which recognizes and attempts to correct past discrimination has never resulted in traditional
suspect classes such as race or gender becoming any less suspect. The very ordinance the Court in Cleburne struck down demonstrates the fallacy of the Court's position. 195 The special permit requirement for "hospitals for the feebleminded" on the city of Cleburne's
books was certainly a product of a less enlightened time. 196 Yet the

188. Id. at 446.
189. Id. at 438 (quoting Cleburne Living Ctr. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 197 (5th
Cir. 1984), affd in part and vacated in part, 473 U.S. 432 (1985)).
190. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-85 (1973).
191. TRIBE, supra note 31, at 1597.
192. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 443-44.
193. Id. at 467 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
194. See id. at 466-67 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Marshall points out: "The Court, for example, has never suggested that race-based classifications
became any less suspect once extensive legislation had been enacted on the subject." Id. at 467
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
195. Id. at 436. The ordinance required a special permit for the construction of "hospitals
for the insane or feeble-minded." Id.
196. See id. at 467, 474 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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modern-day city council used it to prevent a group of mentally retarded
adults from establishing a home in the community. 197 The city council
acted as it did if not on its own collective prejudices, then on those
of its local constituency. 19 In fact, the city council was so strongly
determined to exclude the retarded from its neighborhoods that it
pursued this desire up to the Supreme Court.199 It is hard to imagine
a clearer example of legislative discrimination, or of mentally retarded
people's political powerlessness in the face of irrational prejudice. It
is also hard to imagine a better justification for heightened judicial
protection.
The Court justifies its refusal to extend greater protection to the
mentally retarded with the assertion that "in the vast majority of
situations" legislation concerning the retarded is "not only legitimate
but desirable." This illustrates the Court's institutional shortcomings
in this area. Whether or not the vast majority of such legislation
legitimately takes retardation into account is a question of fact that
the Court is not well suited to answer. 201 Neither is the Court in a
position to ascertain whether, on the whole, facially neutral legislation
is generally applied without prejudice, nor whether or not there exist
whole categories of laws which were promulgated with discriminatory
purpose.2 Even more fundamentally, answers to these larger questions are found only through understanding the experiences of mentally
retarded citizens and the impact of laws on them. The resolution of
all these factual questions is more properly left to the competence of
a legislative body such as Congress, whose determinations can guide
the Court in addressing equal protection challenges on a case-by-case
basis.2 3 Because the Court was institutionally unable to adequately
address the full scope of the issue of suspect criteria, its findings on
the matter fall short of full enforcement of equal protection.

197. Id. at 436-37.
198. See id. at 450; id. at 455 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 465 (Marshall, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
199. See id. at 432.
200. Id. at 444.
201. See Cox, supra note 25, at 209.
202. See id. at 228-29. Professor Cox argues that "[w]hether a state law denies equal
protection depends to a large extent upon the finding and appraisal of the practical importance

of relevant facts." Id.
203.

See Gordon, supra note 59, at 671.
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An Invitation to Act

In Cleburne, Justice Marshall warned that the Court's refusal to
find the retarded to be a quasi-suspect class, combined with its application of a heightened scrutiny to the law in question, would leave
lower courts "in the dark. ''2° These courts would have no principled
foundation for dealing with equal protection challenges by disabled
persons. 2 5 This dire prediction is borne out by subsequent lower court
20 6
decisions attempting to apply the Cleburne reasoning.
These opinions fall mostly into two categories. The first are those
which acknowledge the disabled have been found not to be a quasi-suspect class, but then apply Cleburne's heightened rational basis scrutiny
to the legislation in question rather than the traditional mere rationality test.2 07 The majority of these cases do recognize the difference
between the traditional rationality test and the Cleburne rationality
test, and read Cleburne as requiring closer scrutiny when the challengers are disabled. 20 8 One circuit court even chastised the trial court for
errantly applying
the lower mere rationality standard rather than the
"second order ''209 rationality of Cleburne.210
The cases of the second category which follow the Cleburne precedent similarly assert that the disabled are not a quasi-suspect class.211
They then apply, however, the traditional highly deferential rational
basis test instead of the Cleburne rationality test.21 2 It is these cases
that might have had different results had the Court overtly extended
heightened protection to the mentally disabled as a class.
As these cases demonstrate, since Cleburne, the question of exactly
how to deal with equal protection claims brought by disabled persons

204. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 460 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
205. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
206. See, e.g., Contractors Ass'n of Eastern Pa., Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 735 F. Supp
1274, 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (assuming that Cleburne's holding on the status of mentally retarded
persons extends to all disabled persons as a class).
207. See, e.g., Sullivan v. City of Pittsburgh, 811 F.2d 171, 184-85 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 849 (1987); Phan v. Virginia, 806 F.2d 516, 521 n.6 (4th Cir. 1986); Marks v. City
Council of Chesapeake, 723 F. Supp. 1155, 1161-63 (E.D. Va. 1988), affd, 883 F.2d 308 (4th
Cir. 1989).
208. See, e.g., Knutzen v. Eben Ezer Lutheran Hous. Ctr., 815 F.2d 1343, 1354 (10th Cir.
1987).
209. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 460 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
210. Knutzen, 815 F.2d at 1354.
211. See, e.g., Lussier v. Dugger, 904 F.2d 661, 671 (11th Cir. 1990); Douglas v. Stallings,
870 F.2d 1242, 1245-46 (7th Cir. 1989); Edward 13.v. Paul, 814 F.2d 52, 55-56 (1st Cir. 1987).
212. See, e.g., Douglas, 870 F.2d at 1247-49.
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is a difficult one. While many courts do apply the mere rationality
test,213 some seem reluctant to deny a disabled challenger an equal
protection claim based on this low level of review. 214 This judicial
discomfort with a particular classification or standard makes the area
of law ripe for congressional interposition of its own findings. The
Cleburne opinion has in effect issued an invitation for Congress to
act. This action has come in the form of the American with Disabilities
Act of 1990.
IV.

AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 AS A
MANDATE FOR HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY

A.

The Findings of the ADA

Congress passed the ADA with the stated purpose to
provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities; to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable
standards addressing discrimination... [and] to invoke the
sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment . . . in order to address
. . . discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.215
Armed with information gathered over three years of hearings
covering thousands of hours of testimony from hundreds of different
sources, Congress felt compelled to act on what has been called the
next great leap forward in civil rights legislation.216 The ADA addresses the areas of employment,217 public services, 218 public accommodations, 2' 9 and telecommunications,2 o and expresses Congress' un-

213. See, e.g., Sullivan v. City of Pittsburgh, 811 F.2d 171 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
849 (1987).
214. Id.
215. 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(b)(1), (2), (4) (Supp. II 1990).
216. United States Attorney General Dick Thornburgh, Address at the Business Week
Annual Symposium of Chief Executive Officers (Oct. 12, 1990).
217. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,111-12,117.
218. See id. §§ 12,131-12,165.
219. See id. §§ 12,181-12,189.
220. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 225, 611 (Supp. II 1990).
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equivocal determination to bring individuals with both mental and
physical impairments into the mainstream of society-'
In the "Findings and Purposes" section of the ADA, Congress
presents what for many people must be shocking and eye-opening
findings. Congress presents a bleak picture of how the disabled have
been treated in this country, covering both their present and historical
status as a class. The language in these congressional findings of
fact mirror that of Supreme CourL case law describing the criteria of
suspect classes under the Court's equal protection jurisprudence.3
Congress clearly intended to create a new protected class - the disabled.
The "Findings and Purposes" section- of the ADA lays out the
following facts:
1. the disabled are a discrete and insular minority;225
2. the characteristics of disability are beyond the control of the
disabled individuals;-6
3. the disabled face persistent discrimination, segregation and isolation amounting to a pervasive social problem;2

221. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101(a)(8), 12,101(b), 12,102(2)(A).
222. See id. § 12,101(a).
223. Compare id. § 12,101(a)(7) (finding that "individuals with disabilities are a discrete
and insular minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history
of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our
society") with Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (in finding a particular class not suspect,
the Court reasoned: "As a historical matter, [the class has] not been subjected to discrimination;
they do not exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a
discrete group; and they are not a minority or politically powerless.").
224. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(a).
225. Id. § 12,101(a)(7). This is an unmistakable reference to United States v. Carolene
Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
226. 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(a)(7); see also Lyng, 477 U.S. at 638 (identifying the following
indicia of suspectness: (1) has the class historically been subjected to discrimination; (2) do its
members exhibit immutable or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete
group; and (3) is the group a minority or politically powerless); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 687 (1972) (stating that suspect status arises when laws have "the effect of invidiously
relegating the entire class ... to inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities
of its individual members").
227. 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(a)(2); see Lyng, 477 U.S. at 638; see also Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 10 (1967) ("The Equal Protection Clause requires the consideration of whether classifications drawn by any statute constitute an arbitrary and invidious discrimination."); Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that separate is inherently unequal).
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4. the disabled have been subjected to a history of purposeful
unequal treatment;2 8
5. the disabled as a group occupy an inferior status in society;2
6. the disabled, on the basis of both antipathy and paternalism,
have been relegated to lesser services, benefits, jobs and other opportunities;2 o
7. the disabled have faced discrimination resulting from stereotypic
assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society;2 31
8. the disabled have been relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society;2
9. the disabled, unlike those facing discrimination on the basis of
race, national origin, sex, religion, or age, have often had no legal
recourse to address such discrimination;2 and
10. the disabled continue to face unnecessary and unfair discrimination and prejudice denying them the opportunity to compete on an
equal basis.3
These congressional findings satisfy the full range of criteria for
suspectness under the Court's traditional equal protection jurisprudence. Through the extensive hearings process,2 Congress pieced

228. 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(a)(7); see San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
28 (1973) (noting that some of the 'traditional indicia of suspectness" are whether a class "is
...saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment,
or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection
from the majoritarian political process").
229. 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(a)(6); see Frontiero,411 U.S. at 687.
230. 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(a)(5); see Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684-87; Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384 U.S. 641, 652 (1966) (indicating that Congress may identify access to lesser governmental
services as violations of a groups' equal protection).
231. 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(a)(7); see Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307, 313 (1976) (suspectness arises when a class is "subjected to unique disabilities on the basis
of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities"); Frontiero, 411 U.S. at
688-89.
232. 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(a)(7); see Lyng, 477 U.S. at 638; United States v. Carolene Prod.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (commenting that prejudice against a given class "may be
i special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly
more searching judicial inquiry").
233. 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(a)(4); see San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
28 (1973); Carolene Prod., 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4.
234. 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(a)(9); see Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686.
235. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
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together an analysis of the disabled as a class which rejects the widelyheld misconception that the differences between the disabled and the
non-disabled are purely the product of physical or mental imperfection .3 To the contrary, the findings proclaim that individuals with
disabilities labor under the additional burden of society's ignorance,
prejudice and stigmatization which inexorably widen the gulf between
perception and reality.- 7 Each of these findings carries the weight of
congressional competence to determine the factual basis for claims of
violations of equal protection.- Where the Court before did not have
the correct data to accurately assess the equal protection claims of
the disabled as a class, now the ADA provides it.
B.

How the Findings of the ADA Should Affect the Court

As noted above, the Cleburne Court declared that "absent controlling congressional direction" it must decide equal protection questions
according to its own model.23 The question then is, in what form must
the congressional direction come? Justice Marshall stated in Cleburne
that the beneficial legislation pointed to by the Court should have
been taken as a sign to the Court that Congress had recognized the
need for heightened protection.- ° He wrote:
It is natural that evolving standards of equality come to be
embodied in legislation. When that occurs, courts should look
to the fact of such change as a source of guidance ....
[T]he Court reached this very conclusion [in Frontiero]when
it extended heightened scrutiny to gender classifications and
drew on parallel legislative developments to support that
extensionYl'
Frontiero, decided just after Congress passed the Equal Rights
Amendment and sent it on for ratification by state legislatures,?2
expresses the concept that congressional action should be an important

236. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(a).
237. Id.
238. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
239. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1985).
240. Id. at 466 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
241. Id. at 466 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (referring to Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687 (1973)).
242. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 687.
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consideration to the Court: "Congress has itself manifested an increasing sensitivity to sex-based classifications. . . . Thus, Congress itself
has concluded that [such] classifications... are inherently invidious,
and this conclusion of a coequal branch of Government is not without

significance.

....

,,24

The Frontiero Court relied on both Morgan and Mitchell,2 which
hold that section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment allows Congress to
identify violations of equal protection.?45 In Frontiero, heightened judicial scrutiny was a remedy for such congressionally-idefitified violations.2 6
Under the Court's equal protection model, heightened scrutiny of
legislation has been a powerful tool in detecting impermissible classifications. Heightened scrutiny does not result in judicial second-guessing
of fairly reasoned legislative judgments.? 7 Rather, as Justice Marshall
has stated, it seeks "to assure that the hostility or thoughtlessness
with which there is reason to be concerned has not carried the day." 8
Through heightened scrutiny, the Court compels recognition that a
group may well be the target of prejudicial treatment which offends
the principles of equal protection. 249
In the ADA, Congress provides strong notice to the Court that
the disabled are just such a targeted group, 2 ° and specifically relies
on its power under the Fourteenth Amendment to enact the law.2 1
Using the Morgan analysis of section 5, the answer to the question
of whether the Court should defer to Congress and henceforth recognize the disabled as a quasi-suspect class is clearly yes. Under the
first theory of Justice Brennan's opinion in Morgan, Congress can
designate remedies to discrimination already recognized as equal pro-

243. Id. at 687-88.
244. Id. (citing Justice Brennan's opinion in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 248-49 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) and Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641, 648-49 (1966)).
245. See Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 248-49 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); id. at 143-44 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Morgan, 384 U.S.
at 651 (1966).
246. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 688.
247. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 472 (1985) (Marshall, J.,"
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
248. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
249. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
250. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(a).
251. Id. § 12,101(b)(4).
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tection violations by the Court.?5'- The violations of the rights of the
disabled on the basis of prejudice and antipathy, as established in the
ADA, are the same type of violations the Court has confronted so
extensively in suspect class cases. Heightened scrutiny can easily be
seen as a remedy for these violations of those constitutional principles
already clearly marked out by the Court.
Under the second Morgan theory, Congress may conclude that
certain actions or laws violate the Equal Protection Clause even in
the face of a Supreme Court holding to the contrary.2 Congress,
through the ADA, has done what it has the power, and even the duty,
to do: enforce the concept of equal protection to its fullest extent in
an area where the Court for reasons of deference and incompetence
had failed to do so. The Court in Cleburne did not hold that the
disabled deserved less protection than other minority groups.2
Rather, the Court essentially held that, on the facts as it then perceived them, it could not make a principled determination that disabled
persons were deserving of a higher degree of protection.2 5 Congress
has now used its special competence as finder of fact to identify the
true conditions of the disabled. Thus, the Court must defer to Congress
in their joint pursuit to carry out the command of the Equal Protection
Clause.
V.

CONCLUSION

On its face, the ADA does not- offer an equal protection analysis.
Rather, the ADA specifies accommodations and prohibits certain
exclusionary practices employed by businesses and local governments. 6 This new law, however, does create a potentially radical
change in constitutional equal protection jurisprudence when its "Findings and Purposes" clause is viewed as a mandate that disabled persons
as a class be treated the same as other classes which the Court has
previously protected. The specific findings of Congress indicate that
disabled persons have faced, and continue to face, discrimination comparable to that faced by African-Americans, aliens, women, and the

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

See
See
See
See
See

supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445-47.
id. at 442-47.
42 U.S.C. §§ 12,111-12,117, 12,131-12,165, 12,181-12,189.
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illegitimate. 257 Because those groups are deserving of special protection
under the Equal Protection Clause, 2 so are the disabled.
Findings of fact are critical to the determination of an equal protection claim. These factual questions often guide the determination of
the level of scrutiny afforded to certain groups. 2 9 With its superior
factfinding power, Congress is well-equipped to determine where in
the Court's pre-existing model a group should fall. In passing the
ADA, Congress utilized its factfinding capability to conclude that the
disabled constitute a class clearly in need of heightened scrutiny. In
order to enforce fully the ideals of the Equal Protection Clause, these
congressional findings should be given the full force of law through
the power of section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. By extending
congressionally mandated heightened scrutiny to disabled persons, the
judicial and legislative branches of government can work together to
bring emancipation not only to the disabled, but also to all who will
benefit from their contributions to society.
Amy Scott Lowndes

257.
258.
259.

Compare id. § 12,101(a) with Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41.
See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41.
See, e.g., id.
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